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Memory Hole or Right to Delist? 
Implications of the Right to be Forgotten on Web Archiving 
 
This article studies the possible impact of the “right to be forgotten” (RTBF) on the preservation of 
native digital heritage. It analyses the extent to which archival practices may be affected by the new 
right, and whether the web may become impossible to preserve for future generations, risking to 
disappear from memories and history since no version would be available in public or private 
archives. 
Collective rights to remember and to memory, free access to information and freedom of 
expression, seem to clash with private individuals’ right to privacy. After a presentation of core 
legal concepts of privacy, data protection and freedom of expression, we analyse the case of the 
European Union Court of Justice vs. Google concerning the right to be forgotten, and look deeper 
into the controversies generated by the decision. We conclude that there is no room for concern for 
archives and for the right to remember given the restricted application of RTBF. 
 
data protection, digital archives, web archives, right to be forgotten, memory, privacy, right to 
remember, Google, Wikipedia 
 
Trou Mémoriel ou Droit au Déréférencement ? 
Les Implications du Droit à l’Oubli sur l’Archivage du Web 
 
Cet article étudie l'impact possible du "droit à l'oubli" (RTBF) sur la préservation du patrimoine 
numérique natif. Il analyse si les pratiques d'archivage sont susceptibles d'être affectées par le 
nouveau droit, et s’il pourrait devenir impossible de préserver le Web pour les générations futures, 
avec le risque pour certains contenus de disparaître de la mémoire et de l'histoire si aucune version 
n’était disponible dans les archives publiques ou privées. 
Le droit collectif au souvenir et à la mémoire, l'accès libre à l'information et la liberté d'expression 
semblent entrer en conflit avec les droits individuels à la vie privée. Après une présentation des 
concepts juridiques fondamentaux de la vie privée, de la protection des données personnelles et de 
la liberté d'expression, nous analysons l’arrêt Google de la Cour de Justice de l’Union Européenne 
et le droit à l'oubli, et examinons les controverses qui ont été générées par la décision. On conclut 
que les archives et le droit au souvenir ne seront pas affectés par le droit à l’oubli, étant donné son 
application restreinte. 
 
données personnelles, archives numérique, archivage du Web, droit à l’oubli, mémoire, vie privée, 
droit au souvenir, Google, Wikipedia 
 
1. Introduction  
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The theoretical conflict between the continental European conception of privacy, more protective of 
the individual, and the Anglo-Saxon point of view, in favour of public knowledge, was revived by 
the Google Spain “Right to be forgotten” (RTBF) case of 2014, which keeps attracting a sizable 
amount of academic commentary (Powles and Larsen, 2014). The leading search engine now has an 
obligation “to remove from the list of results displayed following a search made on the basis of a 
person’s name links to web pages, published by third parties and containing information relating to 
that person”, even if the information was lawful. 
 
The legal obligation arising from this case may conflict with preservation and may prevent 
archiving. Wikipedia, that can be considered as a memory institution preserving knowledge and 
heritage, has vocally opposed the ruling through the voice of Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales, Lila 
Tretikov, then Wikimedia Foundation Executive Director (2014), General Counsel Geoff Brigham 
and Legal Counsel Michelle Paulson. They fear that the removal of links will create censorship, 
“memory holes” (Wales, in Curtis & Philipson, 2014), and that the decision would be “undermining 
the world’s ability to freely access accurate and verifiable records about individuals and events” 
(Tretikov, 2014). Other, mostly US legal scholars with a libertarian vision of freedom of expression, 
more extensive than the European conception mindful of privacy, also strongly opposed the ruling, 
fearing that the right could “destroy the Internet archive and become a way to bury evidence” 
(Levine, 2014) or permit “Orwellian airbrushing of history” (Lyons, 2014). 
 
Collective rights to remember and to memory, free access to information and freedom of expression 
seem to clash with private individual rights to privacy. The present article studies, with a socio-legal 
and techno-legal perspective, the possible impact of the “right to be forgotten” (RTBF) on the 
preservation of native digital heritage. It analyses the extent to which the ruling may affect archival 
practices, and whether resources may become impossible to preserve for future generations, risking 
disappearance from memories and history as no version would be available in public or private 
archives. We demonstrate that the RTBF, even if it can be criticized on many other aspects (such as 
the privatisation of quasi-judicial decision, the lack of process transparency, and the reinforcement 
of a quasi-monopolistic hegemony of the search engine on freedom of information), the ruling as 
such is not likely to prevent preservation. The recent legal provision of the right to erase should not 
conflict with archiving, statistical, scientific, and historical research purposes in order to balance 
privacy with the public interest. We contend that the RTBF name is misleading, as the content is not 
removed from the online space  but merely delisted from search results. Thus, the digital resource 
does not disappear, it remains available on the web and can be further analysed and disseminated. 
 
In a first socio-legal part (part 2), after a presentation of core legal concepts of privacy, data 
protection and freedom of expression, we analyse the case and the right to be forgotten, and look 
deeper into the controversies that have been generated by the decision.  
 
Then, in a second techno-legal part (part 3), we explore the concrete implications of the decision on 
web archiving. The RTBF is not the only problem facing web archiving, other challenges and 
regulations exist to remove content. After a presentation of the existing techno-legal arsenal to 
delete, we will explain that web crawlers do not archive everything and point to the more pressing 
issues facing web archiving. 
 
Finally, we explore the impact of the newest version of the RTBF, which will be implemented 
during 2016 in the European General Data Protection Regulation and actually mentions web 
archiving. We look at the detail of the new ‘right to erase’ contained in the Regulation, and we 
comment on a proposed exception for archiving in the public interest. We conclude with the broader 
challenges raised by privacy-by-design and the technical enforcement of 'digital forgetting'. 
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2. The socio-legal context 
 
2.1 Privacy, Data Protection and Freedom of Expression: legal concepts as cultural constructs  
 
In a video about surveillance and privacy, French activists La Parisienne Libérée and Jérémie 
Zimmermann remark that “everyone has something to hide” (Zimmermann & la Parisienne Libérée, 
2014). It can be something innocuous, like a mild Farmville addiction, a guilty musical pleasure, or 
an embarrassing viral video. Some things can be more serious, such as a sexting session that has 
been made public, an incriminating picture that may seriously hinder future employment efforts, 
information about one’s sexual orientation while living or working in a community that has low 
thresholds of tolerance; affiliation to a political entity or union. What if a link to that sensible 
personal information was made available online for the world to see? Could you have a legal 
recourse to remove it? 
 
As a response, Europe has a robust system to ensure the protection of personal data. Article 8 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) clearly specifies that “everyone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” The main embodiment of 
this principle can be found in the application of the 1995 European Data Protection Directive 
(DPD), which enables the information self-determination1 of European citizens (Bygrave, 2002). 
The Data Protection Directive has the main objective of safeguarding the rights of an identified or 
identifiable natural person (known as a data subject), by setting a number principles and situations 
in which any information relating to the data subject (known as personal data) can be processed 
lawfully. Any legal entity that can determine the purpose and means of controlling a subject’s 
personal data is known as a data controller.  
 
The existing Data Protection Directive regime received in 2016 an update in the shape of the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This text updates most of the existing provisions 
contained in the Data Protection Directive in order to better accommodate data protection to the 
digital era. Specifically, the GDPR contains specific provisions regarding the right to be forgotten, 
which we will be covered in more detail in the next section.  
 
The right to privacy and the data protection regime do not exist in a vacuum: a person’s right to 
enjoy a private life can often clash with other rights, particularly the right to freedom of expression 
present in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Over the years, this conflict 
between privacy and freedom of expression has been the source of countless legal battles in the 
courts (Bignami, 2008). There is a long list of cases that pit those two rights against one another, 
including the cases of Douglas v Hello2, and Campbell v MGN3, just to name a few.4 In these 
decisions, courts have tried to reach a balance between competing rights, which tends to be largely 
dependent on the facts of the case. As a general rule, courts have favoured an approach that places 
individual privacy above freedom of expression when the subjects are ordinary citizens, as in 
Wainright v Home Office5 and Google v Vidal-Hall.6 On the contrary, courts are generally more 
likely to side with the public interest to know and with freedom of expression in cases involving 
public figures, such as the aforementioned Douglas and Campbell decisions.  
                                                
1 Information self-determination is the right to control and determine the usage made of one’s personal information. 
2 OBG Ltd v Allan and Douglas v Hello! (2008) 1 Appeals Court 1.  
3 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UK House of Lords 22. 
4 Amongst other, Murray v Express Newspapers Ltd [2007] England and Wales High Court 1980 (Chancery Division); 
Abbey v Gilligan [2012] England and Wales High Court; and Vidal-Hall & Others v Google Inc [2014] England and 
Wales High Court 13 (Queen’s Bench Division).  
5 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UK House of Lords 53.  
6 Google Inc v Vidal-Hall & Otherss [2015] England and Wales Court of Appeals Civil 311.  
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While European courts have tended to provide a careful balance of these two rights, this is not the 
case in the United States, where the traditionally strong protection of freedom of speech has its 
counterpart in a considerably weaker level of privacy safeguard (Charlesworth, 2000). Indeed, the 
U.S. has been following an almost opposed view of privacy to that present in Europe, what Werro 
calls the ‘right to inform’ (Werro, 2009), and others have gone as far as labeling the ‘right to 
remember’ (Balkam, 2014). This right does not exist in any legal sense, but the name neatly 
encapsulates the different approaches to privacy. While Europe has protected privacy to the point of 
creating a new right to be forgotten, the U.S. protects freedom of expression to the extent that it 
almost constitutes a right to remember.  
 
This trans-Atlantic privacy conflict came to its climax in October 2015 when the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) produced a landmark decision in the case Maximilian Schrems v Data 
Protection Commissioner. While the Schrems case does not pit freedom of expression and privacy 
directly, it does illustrate the divergence between the European Union and the United States’ 
treatment of privacy, a conflict that may end up having important financial implications. It also 
serves to explain the very different reactions to the creation of the right to be forgotten.  
 
The case involves Austrian law student and privacy advocate Maximilian Schrems, who initiated 
legal proceedings against the Irish Data Protection Commissioner because, as a European Facebook 
user, he signed up to the terms of use set by Facebook Ireland, the European subsidiary of the US 
company. Because he lives in Europe, he was concerned that his personal data would be sent to the 
United States, and he wanted European regulators to stop such a transfer.  
 
The European Data Protection Directive includes a principle stating that personal data from 
European citizens can only be transferred to a third country if the recipient territory provides an 
adequate level of protection for that data. The level of adequateness is assessed according to several 
circumstances, including “the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed 
processing operation or operations, the country of origin and country of final destination, the rules 
of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the professional rules 
and security measures which are complied with in that country.” It soon became clear that the 
United States could not comply with this principle, and as a lot of data was sent across the Atlantic, 
a solution had to be found. European institutions came up with a so-called “Safe Harbor” allowing 
the transfer of personal data to the United States without having to declare that US law complied 
with data protection requirements. The agreement, reached in 2000, allowed the transfer to 
companies in the US that signed up to the “Safe Harbor Privacy Principles”, a condensed version of 
the provisions contained in the Data Protection Directive. The companies also agreed that the US 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or other oversight schemes would hold them responsible for 
abiding by those principles. 
 
The system had been working for 15 years without incident, but after Edward Snowden provided 
evidence of complicit actions by US technology companies on the mass-surveillance apparatus, 
Schrems alleged that this was evidence of a violation of the data protection principles. Therefore, 
Schrems wanted the courts to declare the Safe Harbor agreements invalid. The case made it all the 
way to the CJEU, which carefully considered the different rights involved, decided to agree with 
Schrems, and declared the existing Safe Harbor invalid because it clearly did not protect European 
citizens adequately. The Court considered that the Data Protection Directive had given Member 
States the power to create national authorities tasked with the obligation to determine how personal 
data is used. By relying on the Safe Harbor decision, the data protection authorities would not have 
the power to examine claims lodged by data subjects, which would erode the very core principles 
behind the data protection regime.  
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2.2 The right to be forgotten  
 
The so called “right to be forgotten” (RTBF) relies on the idea that one has the legal right to remove 
information about oneself that is accessible online and that is potentially damaging to one’s 
enjoyment of a private life, or more accurately, to have it de-listed from search engine results. 
Various authors have pledged for such a right in the last decade. In particular, Viktor Mayer-
Schönberger has been a vocal advocate for a right that allows Internet users to remove undesired 
information from the network (Mayer-Schönberger, 2009). The argument is that the Internet serves 
as a perfect storage place for memories of all sorts, and some of these memories serve no purpose, 
and may even prove to be extremely damaging. While society could simply change to give lower 
credit to these memories, his argument is that there should be a right to delete unwanted information 
from public online spaces.  
 
2.2.1 Context and ruling7 
 
 
Since the early 1995, European law started to move towards this line of argument, and by 2014 the 
building blocks were already there. The Data Protection Directive gives data subjects a variety of 
rights that, in combination, can eventually give rise to the so-called right to be forgotten. Article 6 
of the Directive imposes an obligation for data controllers to keep personal data “accurate and, 
where necessary, kept up to date”, and Article 12 permits data subjects to request for rectification, 
erasure or blocking of data that is incomplete or inaccurate, or where one of the following 
conditions has been met: a) the processing is unlawful; b) the data is no longer necessary in relation 
to the purpose for which it was collected; c) the data subject withdraws consent; d) the data subject 
objects to the processing (Szekely, 2012). All of these are important for the courts to create a right 
to be forgotten on the Internet.  
 
A limited version of this right has now been enacted by the CJEU in the landmark ruling of Google 
Spain v Costeja González (C 131/12). This is the first case that directly applies existing data 
protection principles to the Internet. The case involves Mario Costeja González, a Spanish national, 
whose name was mentioned in a webpage from the Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia detailing 
a real-estate auction connected with proceedings for the recovery of social security debts. Whenever 
someone searched for his name, these pages came up near the top. Mr Costeja González filed a 
complaint with the Spanish Data Protection Agency (Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 
AEPD) using his prerogatives under the Spanish transposition of the Data Protection Directive. 
Based on the aforementioned Articles 6 and 12 of the Data Protection Directive, Mr Costeja 
González requested the removal or alteration of the pages from La Vanguardia, and he also 
requested Google Spain to remove or conceal the personal data relating to him, so that they ceased 
to be included in the search results and no longer appeared in the links to La Vanguardia.  
 
The AEPD denied the request regarding the newspaper La Vanguardia, alleging that the publication 
of such data was legally justified, and it is a common procedure to make such information public in 
the national press. However, the AEPD granted the order concerning Google, and required that 
search engine results involving Mr Costeja González should not include a link to the offending 
pages. In a 2010 decision, the AEPD considered that “operators of search engines are subject to data 
protection legislation given that they carry out data processing for which they are responsible and 
act as intermediaries in the information society.” Unsurprisingly, Google appealed the ruling to the 
national high court (Audiencia Nacional), which referred several questions to the CJEU asking for 
clarification as to the application of the Data Protection Directive.  
 
                                                
7 This section contains commentary previously published in (Guadamuz, 2014).  
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The questions involved in this case are complex, but they can be summarized as follows. Is the 
operation of indexing and crawling the web8 an act of personal data processing? If the answer is 
yes, are search engines (and potentially web crawlers) data controllers, in the sense that they are 
under an obligation to protect personal data? If the answer is again yes, then can data protection 
authorities order a search engine (and potentially a web archive) to remove from their results links 
to websites where personal data has been published, without having to address those websites 
directly? 
 
In other words, the question is whether search engines (and potentially web archives, also using a 
search interface and providing results) should be considered data controllers, and therefore whether 
they should provide users with tools to amend or remove listing to inaccurate personal data. The 
CJEU decided that: 
1. Search engines are to be classified as processing personal data, and therefore are to be 
considered data controllers. 
2. As such, search engines will be deemed to operate in the country by having an office, branch 
or subsidiary “for the purpose of promoting and selling advertising”. 
3. As a data controller, the search engine will have an obligation “to remove from the list of 
results displayed following a search made on the basis of a person’s name links to web 
pages, published by third parties and containing information relating to that person”, even if 
the information displayed in that page is lawful. 
4. When analysing a data subject’s request to remove links to a search result, authorities 
should balance the interest of the subject in accordance to her rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the economic interest of the service provider, the role played 
by the data subject in public life, and the public’s interest to have access to the information. 
 
The decision has universally become known as the “right to be forgotten”, which is technically 
incorrect. The ruling has not created a new right as such, it has simply applied to search engines the 
existing rights to rectification, erasure, blocking and objection which are present in the Data 
Protection Directive and were already applied to personal data gathered by public authorities or 
processed by private entities. The Advocate General stated as much when he commented in his 
opinion that “the Directive does not provide for a general right to be forgotten in the sense that a 
data subject is entitled to restrict or terminate dissemination of personal data that he considers to be 
harmful or contrary to his interests.”9 However, the Advocate General was of the opinion that the 
court should not extend these rights to search engines, which the CJEU eventually did. 
 
This case seems to pit privacy against freedom of speech. Indeed, if a result cannot be found – even  
if it can technically be accessed to when performing another search query, based on other words 
than the name of the person (e.g. the facts or the date) – the practical effect will be obscurity. While 
the court does mention freedom of speech, and makes a few considerations about the ongoing 
balancing act between both, the main thrust of the legal opinion seems directed at the privacy issue. 
The Court comments: 
 
Indeed, since the inclusion in the list of results, displayed following a search made on the 
basis of a person’s name, of a web page and of the information contained on it relating to that 
person makes access to that information appreciably easier for any internet user making a 
search in respect of the person concerned and may play a decisive role in the dissemination of 
                                                
8 A technical act performed either by a search engine as in the case of the Google Spain case, or by a web archiving 
crawler. 
9 The Advocate General provides an opinion before the decision, the court can decide to follow it, rely on it, or ignore it 
(Jääskinen, 2013). 
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that information, it is liable to constitute a more significant interference with the data 
subject’s fundamental right to privacy than the publication on the web page.” 
 
In other words, there may be a privacy violation in a web page that shows up when the data 
subject’s name is queried, but this is less important than the page actually showing up in search 
engine results when the name is queried. However, the court has left open the possibility of a case-
by case appraisal by data protection authorities when asked to grant an order to remove search 
results: 
 
[I]nasmuch as the removal of links from the list of results could, depending on the 
information at issue, have effects upon the legitimate interest of internet users potentially 
interested in having access to that information, in situations such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings a fair balance should be sought in particular between that interest and the data 
subject’s fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. Whilst it is true that the 
data subject’s rights protected by those articles also override, as a general rule, that interest of 
internet users, that balance may however depend, in specific cases, on the nature of the 
information in question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on the interest 
of the public in having that information, an interest which may vary, in particular, according 
to the role played by the data subject in public life. 
 
Notably, there have been a few decisions that support the interpretation that the right to be forgotten 
will be applied on a strict case-by-case basis. The most noteworthy case happened in the 
Netherlands, where a court used Google Spain to answer a request to remove links to potentially 
damaging information. A court in Amsterdam denied a request by the owner of an escort agency 
who was convicted for attempted incitement of arranging a contract killing, a matter currently under 
appeal (Spauwen & van den Brink, 2014). The subject wanted links to the reports of the crime 
removed from search results, but the Dutch court refused the request with an interesting application 
of the interaction between privacy and freedom of expression. The court commented:  
 
The [Google Spain] judgment does not intend to protect individuals against all negative 
communications on the Internet, but only against ‘being pursued’ for a long time by 
‘irrelevant’, ‘excessive’ or ‘unnecessarily defamatory’ expressions. (Spauwen & van den 
Brink, 2014) 
 
This seems a rational interpretation of Google Spain, as its rationale was always to remove links 
that may cause an excessive invasion of privacy. The Dutch court concluded: 
 
The claimant now has to bear the consequences of his own actions. One of the consequences 
of committing a crime is that a person can be in the news in a very negative way and this will 
also leave its tracks on the Internet, maybe even for a very long time. (Spauwen & van den 
Brink, 2014) 
 
This type of approach will probably be followed by national courts in future cases, and the fear 
expressed time and time again by many commentators that Google Spain will be misused by 
criminals and other undeserving recipients may very well be unfounded.  
 
2.3.2 Application of the ruling 
 
The right to be forgotten mostly covers the type of information that is liable to affect significantly 
“the fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data” (Google Spain, 2014), and 
it specifically mentions that the court seeks to have a fair balance between those rights and the 
public’s right to access information. In other words, the decision does not give an unlimited right to 
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remove anything that we do not like from the Web, it simply gives users the right to request the 
removal of links to search results which may seriously infringe a person’s privacy. In order to do so, 
Google has made available a search removal request form in which a subject may apply to exercise 
their rights within the European Union. This means that currently, it is entirely up to Google to 
decide whether such a request will be met or not. 
 
How is Google applying the RTBF? In 2015, the company released a transparency report for 
European privacy requests for search removals (Google, 2015). By this year, Google had received 
249,915 requests, and had evaluated 907,057 URLs for removal, 58% of which were not removed. 
The requests came from all over Europe, but perhaps unsurprisingly, the company received more 
requests from the largest countries in the EU (France, Germany, UK and Spain), with the UK 
accounting for 18,597 alone. In the report, Google cites examples of requests received and how they 
were evaluated: 
 
A victim of rape asked us to remove a link to a newspaper article about the crime. The page 
has been removed from search results for the individual’s name. We received multiple 
requests from a single individual who asked us to remove 20 links to recent articles about his 
arrest for financial crimes committed in a professional capacity. We did not remove the pages 
from search results. “We received a request from a crime victim to remove 3 links that discuss 
the crime, which occurred decades ago. The pages have been removed from search results for 
her name. “An individual asked us to remove links to articles on the internet that reference his 
dismissal for sexual crimes committed on the job. We did not remove the pages from search 
results.” (Google, 2015) 
 
Assuming that this quick snapshot gives a representative picture of the request received by Google, 
there seem to be two main categories of complaints. Firstly, there are people who either have  been 
convicted or are suspected of having committed a crime, and these requests seem to be usually 
denied. Secondly, there are requests addressing more serious privacy threats, such as the 
aforementioned rape victim; those requests are usually granted, and we could argue that in this 
regard the right to be forgotten is working as intended. However, this is a limited take on the actual 
application, as we do not have access to the entire number of requests. 
 
It is important to point out that if the above is an accurate representation of the actual RTBF 
application, then it would at least operate in a similar manner to limited witness and victim 
protection legislation in many countries. For example, in the UK, some vulnerable victims of crimes 
are protected by the law, a protection that can be extended to censoring the press (Temkin, 2003). In 
the past, injunctions and gag orders attempting to keep information from the public eye have easily 
been circumvented with Internet searches, making it impossible to enforce them online 
(Mathiesson, 2010). 
 
Google has also released a list of most links removed by the website that receives the requests. 
Most of the application of the RTBF is centered towards removal of social media posts, with the top 
recipient of removal requests being Facebook. The second top recipient of removal requests is a 
website called Profile Engine, which gathers information held about individuals online. However, 
let us emphasize again that this analysis rests entirely on the little information available from the 
Google transparency report. More data is needed for a better analysis of the true impact of RTBF on 
freedom of expression and the public interest.  
 
Interestingly, another source of information for analysis of removal requests  is to be found when 
third parties, which have had links to them delisted by Google, tell the public of such removals. The 
best source of information outside of Google at the moment is Wikipedia, as they have a reader-
friendly transparency report that now includes RTBF request removals (Wikipedia, Notices 
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received from search engines). While these reports are an important source of information, they are 
limited as they only provide detail of the pages that have been delisted, without indication of who 
actually made the request, or for what reason. At the time of writing, there have been 282 Wikipedia 
articles removed from search results by Google as a result of an RTBF request, with the Dutch and 
English version of Wikipedia having received the majority of delistings. No pattern can be 
identified by looking at the removed pages, as these include reality TV shows (Wikipedia, 
Temptation Island), a porn actress (Wikipedia, Helen Duval), a former criminal (Wikipedia, Gerry 
Hutch), and a trans-gender winner of a reality show (Wikipedia, Nadia Almada). In short, there may 
well be legitimate reasons to delist in these circumstances, but it is impossible to make a full 
assessment.  
 
2.3. The legal controversy: RTBF vs. Freedom of Expression 
 
Commentators around the world have both hailed and criticised the RTBF decision. On the one 
hand, opponents worry that the decision may interfere with free access to information, and that it 
will herald an era of abuse of these amendment orders, even if the court has specified that 
authorities should take into consideration the public interest aspect of the linked data (Zittrain, 
2014). Supporters point out that there are valid reasons why a person would like some personal data 
not to show up when her name is searched, and that there should be a legal recourse to those whose 
privacy is being severely affected (Guadamuz, 2014). 
 
Overall, the coverage of the RTBF has been surprisingly negative. Particularly, commentary in the 
press and US academia has heavily criticised the decision. This is a topic that once more unearths 
the growing chasm between the US and Europe when it comes to the interaction between privacy 
and free speech, with many US commentators seeing the RTBF as an infringement on free speech. 
A common denominator in the criticisms is that the RTBF is going to be used to bury information 
that should be remembered. For example, commentators accused the RTBF of favouring censorship 
and preventing freedom of information: “one person's right to be forgotten may be another person's 
right to remember” (Solon, 2014). Because Google does not host the data, it should not be 
responsible for it (Rosen, 2012). Indeed, Internet Service Providers managed to get safe harbour 
legislations limiting their responsibility. Concerns for culture and memory if archiving is hampered 
have also been raised: “The need to remember” also happens in “online spaces of remembrance” 
(Parmar, 2014).  
 
Other authors have highlighted the vagueness of the right, stressing, for example, that “since the 
right to be forgotten is such an amorphous concept, when employed in the service of guarding one's 
reputation, it makes the task of balancing rights even more complicated” (Fazlioglu, 2013). 
 
Finally, some commentators (Tréguer, 2015) have criticized the ruling as being a good example of 
the so-called “privatization of censorship” (Tambini, Leonardi & Marsden, 2008); this is because 
Google is given the power to determine which results should be removed, instead of this important 
function going to a court of law. However, if a user is denied the application, this could be litigated 
in court. While it is true that Google retains considerable control over the RTBF enforcement, users 
can indeed still appeal decisions to data protection authorities and/or the courts. The power of the 
national Data Protection authorities tends to be forgotten in the debate, and it has been boosted by 
the Schrems case.  
 
This being said, the question of Google’s applications is perhaps the most important point of debate 
and an aspect of the ruling that has been lost in the privacy versus freedom of expression discourse. 
The current implementation of the RTBF rests considerably on a firm, who has the power to review 
the decision and deny the application, and who is directly responsible for existing unsuitable 
examples. This kind of power has led several academics to issue a request (Open Letter) to Google 
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for more transparency about the way in which it applies the right. As Google has become such an 
important broker in this area, there is a growing need to understand the type of requests that are 
handled, and what parameters are being used to make decisions. This open letter says: 
 
We all believe that implementation of the ruling should be much more transparent for 
at least two reasons: (1) the public should be able to find out how digital platforms 
exercise their tremendous power over readily accessible information; and (2) 
implementation of the ruling will affect the future of the RTBF in Europe and 
elsewhere, and will more generally inform global efforts to accommodate privacy 
rights with other interests in data flows. (Open Letter) 
 
The RTBF could work mirroring an existing mechanism that helps to remove false positives, this is 
the notice and take down procedures for copyright infringing materials (Urban & Quilter, 2006). 
Over the years, content has been removed in Google services such as YouTube due to mistaken or 
malicious removal requests, only to be restored once the affected party has complained. It would be 
possible to deploy a similar regime for RTBF requests, both with more transparency and with a 
stronger system of protection for freedom of expression.  
 
While some of these concerns are legitimate, some critics apparently fail to understand how limited 
the new right is in practice. As stated before, the CJEU tried to base their decision on privacy, 
leaving out most of the balancing act between privacy and data protection. There is something to be 
said about the political power of remembrance, particularly in countries that housed secretive and 
repressive regimes where people were “erased” from history; but we must understand the Google 
Spain decision as a much more nuanced allowance to delist information to protect privacy.  
 
There has been a rush to assume that the right will affect data integrity and online archiving as 
mentioned in the introduction by Wikipedia founder and executives, or in a widely read blog (Hole, 
2014); however, we argue that this is not what the ruling implies. The right mostly covers the type 
of information that is liable to affect significantly “the fundamental rights to privacy and to the 
protection of personal data”, and it specifically mentions that the court seeks to have a fair balance 
between those rights and the public’s right to access information. In fact, a large part of the debate 
so far has been tainted by overlooking the precise wording of the ruling.  
 
3. Implications of the RTBF ruling on web archiving 
 
Web archival is faced with personal data in everyday practice, as soon as a document mentions the 
name of a person, but even when the person is not named but identified by characteristics that allow 
to deduce her name by association (Szekely, 2014). 
 
3.1 Web archiving crawlers don’t archive the entire web 
 
Web archiving is facing other hurdles than the right to erasure. Web archiving started as early as 
1996 with efforts to develop better crawlers and alternate between blind and selected crawling 
(Masanes, 2002; Brügger, 2011). Preservation is operated by private search engines and foundations 
(such as Internet Archive), public heritage institutions (national libraries) and also academics 
archaeologists and web historians in unstructured (Jeffrey, 2012) and structured manners: 
 
Since the mid-1990s a number of international and national web archives have been founded, 
and easy-to-use web archiving software has been developed, thus enabling scholars to do their 
own web archiving(...) the most widespread is web harvesting, i.e. the retrieving of web 
material from web servers by the use of crawler software that ‘crawls’ the web based on a list 
of web addresses (URLs) to archive. (Brügger, 2012). 
11 
 
Commons-based solutions of peer archiving, such as the Day of Archaeology (Day of Archeology) 
initiative, are also developed to avoid the “digital dark age” of user-generated content (Jeffrey, 
2012). 
 
Because of the Google Spain ruling, the RTBF and the right to erasure, and the general practices 
and notice and takedown, web archiving will not preserve the entire web. Does that really matter 
beyond open data extremists, and “memory-maniacs”? (Parmar, 2014). 
 
In reality, most of the content is not permanent. It disappears, sometimes even before it gets a 
chance to be archived: according to various studies, 85% within a year and 59% within a week 
(Ambrose, 2012), links get broken, hosting stops or dies, content gets overwritten. There is a 
“missing web” and web archiving is “almost always deficient” (Brügger, 2012). It has always been 
up to librarians, historians and archivers to choose what content, today on blogs and websites, is to 
be preserved in Internet Archives and National Libraries collections. 
 
National libraries do not collect the entire web and do not rely on search engines to crawl the web. 
The French National Library selects websites to be archived based on a list of domain names 
delivered by French operators Afnic (managing French country code top-level domain names) and 
OVH (providing hosting and domain name registration), and complete their collections around 
events and topics selected by the curators. 
 
3.2 The existing techno-legal arsenal to delete 
 
Currently, there seem to be no reason to believe that the RTBF will affect web archiving. Beyond 
RTBF and the right to de-indexation however, web archiving is subjected to other laws and users’ 
requests, which can already effectively remove content. For example, the British Library 
implemented a Notice and Take Down policy to assess requests to remove content or stop making it 
available. Their website provides the following explanation on their practices (British Library): 
 
Valid reasons for withdrawing or removing material include, but are not limited to: 
 Agreements for embargoing access 
 Court injunctions 
 Legal requirements 
 Proven violations of copyright or database right, not covered by legal deposit 
legislation or a limitation or exception in UK copyright law 
 Material that has been found to be libellous or defamatory 
 Breaches of confidentiality (British Library). 
 
Another example is the Wayback machine robot, which follows links and preserves webpages it can 
find. In principle, it is very easy to opt out from archiving, just by adding a robots.txt file to stop the 
crawler and ask previous content to be removed. 
 
These practices lead us to believe that the Google Spain ruling will have little effect upon archiving, 
as there are already procedures in place to have content removed from the archives on request 
without judicial proceeding. Practices will evolve even without legal requirements, and it will be 
interesting to see which strategies and techniques archives adopt concerning personal information 
held in the records. On that note, the former British Library Head of web archiving makes the 
following remark: 
 
The Google case does not significantly change our current notice and take-down policy for 
non-print Legal Deposit material. However, we will review our practice and procedures to 
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reflect the judgement, especially with regard to indexing, cataloguing and resource discovery 
based on individuals’ names.” (Hockx-Yu, 2014).  
 
However, as section 3.4 will discuss in more detail, the RTBF will be built into legislation as a new 
right to erasure contained in the General Data Protection Regulation, which will come into effect in 
2016, and which will end-up going much further than the existing version of the RTBF contained in 
Google Spain. As discussed, there is currently no evidence to indicate that web archives are being 
affected by the RTBF, as they are already required to remove links to content. With the enactment 
of the General Data Protection Regulation it may be possible to foresee a future in which web 
archives will be required to perform actions that are more cumbersome than those already in 
existence. However, this is speculation, and we will need to wait and see.  
 
Web archives may have more reasons for concern in other de-listing and blocking practices, namely 
copyright, data materiality and mistakes. These include: “Findings outline the challenges that still 
face researchers who wish to engage seriously with web content as an object of research, and 
archivists who must strike a balance reflecting a range of user needs.” (Dougherty & Meyer, 2014). 
 
Copyright may prevent the preservation of digital native content in jurisdictions that do not have a 
legal deposit law and/or an exception to copyright for libraries (Dulong de Rosnay & Musiani, 
2012). Legal deposit laws indeed do not trump copyright on digital native content that can be 
consulted only on the premises of the libraries. Besides archiving, content collected by means of 
legal deposit is not made available online, to the public or to search engines. The consultation of 
content collected through legal deposit, whose reproduction is authorized on the basis of the legal 
deposit of the press, which is part of heritage law and not of copyright law, is available on the 
premises only for consultation by accredited researchers. The British Library Head of web archiving 
recalls that “websites archived for Legal Deposit are only accessible within the Legal Deposit 
Libraries’ reading rooms and the content of the archive is not available for search engines (Hockx-
Yu, 2014). According to French law for legal deposit 10, authors cannot prevent authorized 
organisms (the national library) to reproduce their work for the purpose of preservation and onsite 
consultation by accredited researchers for their usage only; but this does not cover online 
publication. Similarly, the Twitter archive at the Library of Congress is not open for research. 
 
3.3 Right to erasure, right to remember 
 
While the RTBF was originated from the interpretation given to the existing law by the CJEU in 
2014, a 2016 development is about to move the debate forward considerably. The aforementioned 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which comes into force in 2016, repeals the Data 
Protection Directive and establishes an updated regime geared towards the digital age. One of the 
biggest changes present in the Regulation is that it consolidates the various rights and principles 
from the existing Directive that were dealing with outdated and/or erroneous data, and puts them 
together into a new full-fledged right, the “right to erasure.” Article 17 of the GDPR will create an 
obligation for Member States to provide data subjects with the right to obtain from the controller 
erasure of personal data where one of various requirements contained in Articles 5 and 6 have not 
been met. Some of these requirements relevant for the existing article are: 
 
a) The data is no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which it was collected or 
processed. 
b) The data subject has withdrawn his consent.  
c) The data subject objects to the processing and there is no legitimate grounds to deny this 
request. 
                                                
10 Code du patrimoine Article L132-4. Modifié par la loi n°2006-961 du 1 août 2006 - art. 42 JORF 3 août 2006  
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d) The data has been processed unlawfully.  
 
There is a glaring omission to the above, and it is the existing requirement that data must be “must 
be accurate and kept up to date.” While the proposed right to erase gives some more power to the 
user to object processing, the very founding principle behind Google Spain is no longer relevant. In 
some ways, this makes the right to erase very different from the RTBF version.  
 
Furthermore, Article 17 contains an inbuilt reference to balance with freedom of expression, 
paragraph 3 has an exception to the right to erase for the purpose of “exercising the right of freedom 
of expression and information.” This should hopefully lay to rest most of the criticism mentioned 
which see the RTBF as a possible threat to freedom of expression.  
 
The main issue to understand when it comes to archiving is that the RTBF does not undermine the 
original content directly; it only requires that a search engine should remove the link to the content.  
 
Indicative of this type of thinking is the use of the term “right to remember” (Lee, 2014). As it has 
been stated already, this is a concept that does not have any legal basis, and it is used mostly as a 
rhetorical device. Opponents usually support this argument by highlighting and publicizing cases 
where links were removed undeservedly, and then they make an argument on behalf of the public’s 
right to know, freedom of speech, or in this case, a non-existent right to remember.  
 
The Regulation has an even more important exception for the purposes of web archiving. Article 
17(3)(d) states that there will not be a right to erase “for archiving purposes in the public interest, or 
scientific and historical research purposes or statistical purposes,” given that the right to erase is 
likely to “render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the objectives of the archiving 
purposes in the public interest, or the scientific and historical research purposes or the statistical 
purposes.” 
 
Thus, while the above is not a full exception for archiving purposes, it safeguards archiving from 
most potentially problematic effects of the right to erase. So any erasure that would impair 
archiving cannot be granted. However, this will be a question of evidence: archives will have to 
give proof that an exercise of the right to erase will hinder archiving, and that these purposes are in 
the public interest. Conversely, it is still possible that the right to erase would apply to an archive if 
it cannot be proven that the erasure affects the public interest. In this regard, there may still be room 
for concern for archivists. The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance has complained, in 
this respect, that the language of the GDPR iss imprecise and could lead, if left to the interpretation 
of individual archivists, archives to restrict access to sources, while they should remain “in full and 
open access” (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance). 
 
The ruling is not a real RTBF with “erasure” from the controller and “abstention from further 
dissemination” as considered in the 2011 draft proposal of General Data Protection Regulation and 
the 1995 Directive. Both texts are defining personal data broadly as “any information related to an 
identified or an identifiable person,” thus possibly including re-identification of persons after data 
anonymisation or involuntary traces, through linkability. This proposal of erasure caused anxiety in 
the archivist professions. 
 
In the recent history of the drafting of the GDPR, there has been relatively little commentary from 
archives and memory institutions. Whether this is because archives do not see a threat from RTBF 
as such, or because they have been satisfied with the proposed changes contained in the 2016 
Regulation, is unclear. In one notable example, the Association of French Archivists (Association 
des Archivistes Français), asked in 2013 for the EU not to “forbid data preservation”, as they 
considered that the GDPR would contain rules that would make it an obligation for archives to 
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destroy or anonymise the data. These concerns did not materialise. Furthermore, at the time they 
were criticised by Jan-Philipp Albrecht, a German member of the European Parliament, as “a little 
bit exaggerated and misleading” (Pfanner, 2013).  
 
A recent press communication on the GDPR reveals another issue: the above-mentioned 
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance advocates to member states of the EU to “take all 
necessary steps to facilitate the opening of archives in order to ensure that all documents bearing on 
the Holocaust are available to researchers.” They comment that while the GDPR would contain 
some exceptions for historical research, they were concerned about the imprecision of the language. 
The same concern to find the truth and never forget has been expressed in relation with the search 
for truth in Latin America: “the content of this “right” notwithstanding, the name itself was an 
affront to Latin America; rather than promoting this type of erasure, we have spent the past few 
decades in search of the truth regarding what occurred during the dark years of the military 
dictatorships.” (Bertoni, 2015). 
 
However, even if the language of the Regulation is clear enough to allow a right to remember, we 
will undoubtedly need guidelines from national data protection regulators to ensure that historical 
archives are not negatively affected. For the time being, the ambiguity present in the RTBF Google 
Spain ruling is about to disappear.  
 
4. Conclusion: Forget and delete, Privacy-by-Design for web archiving 
 
While the right to be forgotten has been interpreted as a potential threat to freedom of expression, 
memory and web archiving, the intended application of the right to be forgotten has been limited in 
scope, at least as far as one can discern from the limited information available through Google’s 
transparency report. Besides, web archiving professionals are already deleting instances on request, 
and other legal frameworks, namely copyright, are more likely to generate memory holes than 
RTBF. However, the entry into force of the General Data Protection Regulation should put most of 
the debate to rest, the presence of exceptions to the right to erase for both freedom of expression 
and archiving in the public interest serving to make potentially damaging disruption much more 
difficult. Future work in this area may explore wider issues.  
 
First, the right to forget may rely on broader foundations than data protection. The threat to 
individual’s privacy created by mass-surveillance and big data gathering and processing, by both 
public and private players, has become one of the most important subjects of our time (Schneier, 
2015). As a response to algorithmic governance, some commentators ask for some form of right to 
delete (Mayer-Schönberger, 2009; Rouvroy, 2008). The object of such a right is not to hinder 
preservation and memory, it is to limit the effect of data mining and data analysis and restore 
balance in the power relation between surveillance and other marketing information systems and 
individuals (Szekely, 2014). Besides, research in ethics, psychology and other fields, link some 
form of right to be forgotten to victims’ right of information self-determination and the 
(re)construction of identity and personality requiring underlying rights11. 
 
Second, the question is broader than a binary choice between disclose (and preserve) or delete, and 
there can be technical solutions to manage level of publicity. There can be circles of divulgation: 
family, work, medical services (Szekely, 2012). Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs), more 
                                                
11“Recommendation on the microfilm recording of documents containing personal data relating to the persecution of 
Jews during the Nazi period, and on their transfer to the Yad Vashem Archives in Jerusalem”. In The first three years of 
the Parliamentary Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, edited by László Majtényi. Budapest: 
Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, 1998. – An analysis of 
conflicts between the legitimate purposes of unveiling historical events and the privacy rights of the victims of history. 
Cited by Szekely Ivan (2012). 
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recently labelled Privacy-by-Design solutions, are developing “contextual approaches” 
(Nissenbaum, 2011). User-centric identity management systems (PRIME and PrimeLife cited by 
Szekely, 2012) propose to implement laws and preferences, and crawl the web to delete photos after 
a specific time. Thus, the question would be not to rely on legal tools, but on the technical 
implementation and feasibility of an actual and real RTBF, which would remove all instances of the 
resource and make it impossible to access, reproduce and disseminate them. 
 
In the same vein, engineers and computer scientists are leading further work on Digital Rights 
Management (DRM), which had been devised to control the unauthorised flow of music on peer-to-
peer networks. Removing content because of copyright or because of privacy leads to the same act. 
Access control measures may be used try to implement the RTBF and erasure, using semantic web 
and linked data web standards. This would be a paradox, since these protocols were developed to 
share content, rather than to implement conditional access restrictions and manage consent (O'Hara, 
2012; Kasioumis et al, 2014). The standards of the preservation activities such as PREMIS, METS 
and the standards developed by the copyright industry (Dulong de Rosnay, 2007, 2016) remain 
available. MPEG-21 ISO Digital Item Declaration, an access control standard adopted in 2003 and 
revised in 2005, has been revised for and adapted to the RTBF in 2014: “enforcement of 'digital 
forgetting' is implemented over an information-centric model for the Internet. The defined solution 
enables the definitive elimination of digital objects, either on-demand or on a pre-scheduled basis, 
and, hence, their 'forgetting.'” (Almeida et al, 2014). 
 
Digital golems12 (Dulong de Rosnay, 2016), machines implementing actions automatically – 
encoding rules into technical specifications, being Digital Rights Management systems (DRM) for 
copyright, or a Privacy-by-Design digital forgetting instrument which would be implementing a 
RTBF – are  not part of dystopian future. They are an illustration of the conflict between regulation 
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